The local and regional impact of the UK's welfare reforms by Beatty, Christina & Fothergill, S
1 
 
THE LOCAL AND REGIONAL IMPACT OF THE UK’S WELFARE 
REFORMS 
 
Christina Beatty and Steve Fothergill 
Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research, Sheffield Hallam University, Unit 10 
Science Park, City Campus, Howard Street, Sheffield S1 1WB 
C.Beatty@shu.ac.uk, natsec@ccc-alliance.org  
 
 
Abstract 
 
The Coalition government that came to power in the UK in 2010 is implementing 
unprecedented welfare reforms.  These have the effect of substantially reducing payments to 
a wide range of low-income and out-of-work households.  This article examines the local and 
regional impact of the reforms, showing how national reforms have a sharply different impact 
on different places.  Taken as a whole, the welfare reforms impact most on derived areas 
and are widening the gap in prosperity between the best and worst local economies across 
the UK. 
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Introduction 
 
The 2008 financial crisis ushered in a new era of ‘austerity’ in many Western economies.  
After a brief period when governments' budget deficits were allowed to grow to ease the 
effects of recession, the financial orthodoxy has been that deficits should be reduced.  In the 
UK, the focus of this article, the emphasis has been on reducing public spending as the main 
way of cutting the deficit.  The Coalition government that came to power in 2010 has sought 
to reduce spending on welfare benefits, in particular, by a combination of tighter restrictions 
in eligibility and reductions in the value of payments (HM Treasury 2010). 
 
The intention of the UK’s welfare reforms has been not only to save money.  The aim has 
also been to ‘make work pay’ by raising the financial incentives for out-of-work claimants to 
take a job, in the expectation that levels of unemployment will as a result be reduced 
(Department for Work and Pensions 2010a). 
 
The UK’s welfare reforms are a national strategy implemented by a Westminster government 
but applying in nearly every detail to the whole of the UK, including Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland, where there are now devolved administrations with discretion over a wide 
range of other matters.  Unlike in the United States, where individual states have a say in the 
form and level of welfare provision, in the UK municipal authorities, even in the largest cities, 
cannot ‘opt out’ or introduce their own version of the reforms. 
 
It is inevitable that national welfare reforms of this kind have a different impact on different 
places, if for no other reason than the fact that the claimant rate of so many welfare benefits 
varies a great deal across the country.  This article therefore traces the financial impact of 
the UK’s welfare reforms on different cities, regions and districts.  This is an explicitly 
empirical exercise but one that demonstrates how national austerity policies can have local 
consequences that, if not entirely unsurprising, were certainly not thought through nor 
articulated in advance. 
 
Welfare reform is a deeply contentious issue in the UK and in documenting the impacts the 
present article does not attempt to comment on the merits of the reforms.  However, it is 
important that the impact on different places is fully exposed because this is a key dimension 
that is too often overlooked.  The impact on different places is also one of the yardsticks by 
which the reforms should be judged. 
 
 
Existing evidence 
 
Although ‘welfare reform’ is not a wholly new concept in the UK – all social security systems 
are modified from time to time – prior to 2010 the reform agenda was dominated by the 
introduction of the Labour government’s New Deals.  These offered greater support to return 
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to work alongside, in many cases, stronger obligations to take part in the available 
programmes (see for example Department for Work and Pensions 2006).  The impact of the 
New Deals on different places across the country is an issue that has attracted attention 
(Sunley et al 2005, Theodore 2007).  More generally, Labour’s social policy record as a 
whole has been subject to comprehensive scrutiny (Lupton et al 2013). 
 
The welfare reforms introduced since 2010 have a distinctly different focus, targeting instead 
the scope of entitlement and the financial value of benefits.  The reforms also extend well 
beyond just out-of-work benefits.  With lower public spending as the ultimate goal, the 
reforms are best understood in the context of wider debates about the policy response to the 
2008 financial crisis (Boyer 2012, King et al 2012, Sawyer 2012) and the geographical 
impact of austerity (Kitson et al 2011). 
 
The welfare reforms themselves are however generally too recent to have attracted much 
scrutiny in academic journals or books.  Indeed, given the lead-times in implementation 
some of the impacts have been slow to be felt.  Unsurprisingly, therefore, much of the 
evidence on the post-2010 reforms is so far piecemeal and in the form of reports rather than 
journal articles. 
 
Most of the literature to date focuses on specific elements of the reform package, notably the 
impact of Housing Benefit reform (National Audit Office 2012) and in particular its impact on 
housing associations and their tenants (Consortium of Associations in the South East 2012, 
Chuvunga 2012, Hickman and Reeve 2013, Ipsos MORI 2013, Riverside Group 2013, 
Williams et al 2013).  The published evidence on the impact of the Housing Benefit reforms 
on the private-rented sector is presently more limited (Beatty et al 2012, 2013).  Other 
studies have focussed on the impact of the welfare reforms on specific places, for example 
Hampshire (Beatty et al 2011), Manchester (Jackson and Nixon 2012), North East England 
(Edwards et al 2013) and Haringey and Birmingham (Slay and Penny 2013). 
 
By comparison, quantitative evidence on collective impact of the reforms across different 
parts of the UK as a whole has been distinctly lacking.  The report on which the present 
article is based (Beatty and Fothergill 2013) can justifiably claim to be the first in this regard.  
Since its publication, in April 2013, a second report (Wilson et al 2013) has presented similar 
calculations, though only for England rather than GB as a whole. 
 
 
The UK’s welfare reforms 
 
The figures presented here cover ten major welfare reforms that were underway or initiated 
in the UK between 2010 and 2013.  These are listed in Table 1.  They comprise a wide 
range of reductions in assistance with housing costs, a new cap on household entitlement, 
more restrictive eligibility for incapacity and disability benefits, reductions in benefits to 
families with children, reductions in tax credits for lower and middle income households and 
below-inflation uprating of most working-age benefits. 
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Table 1: Details of UK welfare reforms 
 
HOUSING BENEFIT: (1) LOCAL HOUSING ALLOWANCE 
 Maximum rents set at 30
th
 percentile of local rents, rather than 50
th
 percentile, from 2011-12 
 Caps on maximum rents for each property size, with 4-bed limit, from 2011-12 
 Abolition of £15 excess formerly retained by tenants paying below maximum LHA rent, from 2011-12 
 Increase age limit for shared room rate from 25 to 35, from January 2012 
 Switch from 30
th
 percentile rents to CPI indexation for LHA, from 2013-14 
HOUSING BENEFIT: (2) UNDER-OCCUPATION 
 Limit Housing Benefit payments to working-age households in social rented accommodation to a 
level reflecting the number of bedrooms justified by the size and age composition of the household, 
from 2013-14 
NON-DEPENDANT DEDUCTIONS 
 Up-rating the deductions in stages between April 2011 and April 2014 to reflect growth in rents and 
increases in Council Tax since 2001, when the deductions were frozen, and subsequent link to prices 
HOUSEHOLD BENEFIT CAP 
 Total household benefit payments for working-age claimants capped so that workless households 
receive no more in benefit than the average weekly wage, after tax and national insurance, from 
2013-14, administered through Housing Benefit payments 
COUNCIL TAX BENEFIT 
 10 per cent reduction in expenditure by HM Treasury and transfer of responsibility for the scheme to 
local authorities, from 2013-14. 
 Reduction in entitlement only permitted for working-age households; entitlement of pensioner 
households fully protected. 
 Some local authorities in England have chosen not to pass on the reduction to claimants, in whole or 
in part, absorbing the cut within their budget.  In Scotland and Wales the devolved administrations 
have made arrangements that avoid the reduction falling on claimants 
DISABILITY LIVING ALLOWANCE 
 Phased replacement of Disability Living Allowance (DLA) for working-age claimants by Personal 
Independence Payments (PIP), from 2013-14 
 Introduction of more stringent medical test and regular re-testing 
 Reduction in number of payment categories 
INCAPACITY BENEFITS 
 Introduction of Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) for new claimants and a new, tougher 
medical test (the Work Capability Assessment), from October 2008 
 Applying the Work Capability Assessment to existing incapacity claimants from autumn 2010 
onwards, and migration to ESA if not deemed ‘fit for work’ 
 Time-limiting to 12 months non-means tested entitlement for ESA Work Related Activity Group, from 
2012-13 
 New conditionality for ESA Work Related Activity Group 
CHILD BENEFIT 
 Freeze benefit rates for three years from 2011-12, instead of up-rate with inflation 
 Withdrawal of benefit from households including a higher earner (threshold at £50,000 and taper to 
£60,000), from January 2013 
TAX CREDITS 
 Adjustments to thresholds, withdrawal rates, supplements, income disregards and backdating 
provisions affecting Child Tax Credit and Working Tax Credit, from 2011-12 onwards 
 Changes in indexation and up-rating, from 2011-12 onwards 
 Reductions in childcare element of Working Tax Credit, from 2011-12 
 Increase in working hours requirement for Working Tax Credit, from 2012-13 
1 PER CENT UP-RATING 
 1 per cent up-rating (instead of by CPI) for three years from 2013-14 for main working-age benefits, 
and for two years from 2014-15 for Child Benefit and for Local Housing Allowance within Housing 
Benefit 
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The vast majority of these welfare reforms were initiated by the post-2010 Coalition 
government, notably but not exclusively through the Welfare Reform Act 2012.  Some of the 
incapacity benefit reforms, however, are Labour measures that pre-dated the 2010 general 
election but were only taking full effect in later years.  They have been included here, 
alongside the Coalition’s reforms, to provide a comprehensive view of the impact of the 
reforms concurrently underway. 
 
The figures presented here show the impact when the reforms have come into full effect.  
This is important because some of the reforms are being implemented in stages over a 
number of years.  In most cases the figures show the expected impact in the 2014-15 
financial year.  The exceptions are the incapacity benefit reforms (specifically the wider 
application of means-testing) which take full effect in 2015-16, the 1 per cent up-rating which 
also applies in 2015-16, and the changeover from Disability Living Allowance (DLA) to 
Personal Independence Payment (PIP) which is not expected to be completed until 2017-18. 
 
A close observer of the list of reforms will note a number of apparent omissions.  The most 
significant of these is Universal Credit, which is scheduled to replace just about all means-
tested working age benefits and is arguably the single biggest reform of all.  There are three 
reasons for omitting Universal Credit.  First, Universal Credit is best understood as a 
repackaging of existing benefits.  It introduces for the first time a consistent benefit 
withdrawal rate, intended to ensure that claimants are always financially better off in work, 
but the rules governing eligibility are essentially carried over from the existing benefits it 
replaces.  Second, unlike the other welfare reforms covered here, Universal Credit is not 
expected to result in a net reduction in benefit entitlement.  At the level of the individual or 
household there will winners and losers but on balance Universal Credit is expected to result 
in slightly higher expenditure, particularly as transitional relief will be available to existing 
claimants transferring across.  Third, most of the impact of Universal Credit will be felt well 
beyond 2015.  Its introduction began in 2013 only in a small number of pilot areas and only 
for new claimants.  The full impact is unlikely before 2018, and this assumes that the 
ambitious timetable for implementation can be met. 
 
Two further omissions are worth noting:  The first of these is a further restriction on Income 
Support for lone parents.  The Coalition government has reduced the qualifying age of the 
youngest child from under 7 to under 5, a final stage in the lowering of the age limit from 
what had, less than a decade earlier, been 16.   The effect is to transfer the lone parent from 
Income Support to Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) at the same payment rate.  There is 
therefore no loss of income, but on JSA the lone parent is required to look for work. 
 
The other omission is the changeover from the Retail Price Index (RPI) to the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) as the norm for benefits up-rating.  This was introduced from 2011-12 and 
results in substantial savings to the UK Exchequer, especially in the long-term.  However, 
this reform is really part of a much wider UK accounting reform, including for example all 
public service pensions.  For three years from April 2013, CPI itself has also been 
superseded by the 1 per cent up-rating of most working-age benefits. 
 
When fully implemented, the welfare reforms covered here are expected to save the UK 
Treasury almost £19bn a year. 
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Measuring the impacts 
 
The UK government has in most cases not produced estimates of the local impact of the 
reforms.  It does however publish a range of statistics that allow the local impact to be 
estimated.  This information includes: 
 
 HM Treasury estimates of the overall financial saving arising from each element of 
the reforms, published in the annual Budget or Autumn Statement. The estimates 
here are fully consistent with these Treasury figures. 
 
 The Impact Assessments and (where available) Equality Impact Assessments that 
the DWP publishes for key elements of the reforms (Department for Work and 
Pensions 2010b, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d) 
 
 Benefit claimant numbers and expenditure, by local authority, published by DWP and 
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) 
 
 Additional official statistics – for example on median earnings by local authority to 
help calibrate the impact of the withdrawal of Child Benefit from higher earners 
 
 DWP evidence from pilot schemes, in the context of the incapacity benefit reforms 
 
The starting point in all the calculations is the UK government’s own figure on the anticipated 
financial saving, modified where necessary for inflation (where figures are for different 
financial years), for revision in the implementation timetable (in the case of DLA reform) and 
to include pre-2010 elements of the incapacity benefit reforms. 
 
The key tools in distributing these savings across local areas are the official statistics on 
benefit claimants and expenditure by district.  If there is no reason why a claimant should 
lose more in one place than another the anticipated financial saving to the Treasury can be 
allocated in proportion to claimant numbers.  In other cases – Housing Benefit is a case in 
point because of differences in rent levels – the government’s Impact Assessments 
anticipate that the loss per claimant will be greater in some places than others and this is 
built-in to the calculations. 
 
Whilst this general model applies to estimating the impact of each of the reforms, in practice 
the availability of data and the multi-faceted nature of some of the reforms mean that the fine 
details of the calculations vary.  The numbers adversely affected by reforms to Council Tax 
Benefit, for instance, are taken from monitoring by the New Policy Institute (Bushe et al 
2013) and are based on the actual decisions by local authorities on the extent to which loss 
of government grant is passed on claimants.  The distribution of the loss arising from 
changes to incapacity benefits draws on earlier estimates of the local impact of this 
particularly complex area of reform (Beatty and Fothergill 2011). 
 
The estimates are all based on the data available in March 2013, when the calculations were 
finalised.  In practice, there is a regular flow of new information on claimant numbers and 
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there are occasional adjustments to Impact Assessments.  The most significant concerns the 
number of households affected by the household benefit cap, a figure now reduced from 
56,000 to 40,000 to reflect revised regulations introduced after March 2013 (Department for 
Work and Pensions 2013).  However, the household benefit cap accounts for less than 2 per 
cent of the overall financial saving arising from welfare reform and there is no new data to 
suggest that its geographical impact requires revision. 
 
The full details of the data sources and methods underpinning the calculations are published 
elsewhere (Beatty and Fothergill 2013).  Following official practice in the Impact 
Assessments, the estimates here make no allowance for the small share of the financial 
impact falling on Northern Ireland, which means they slightly overstate the impact on other 
parts of the UK.  In contrast to the original estimates (Beatty and Fothergill 2013), the figures 
here on the numbers adversely affected by the replacement of Disability Living Allowance 
also include those expected to experience a decrease in their award as well as those 
expected to lose entitlement entirely. 
 
In comparing the impact of the welfare reforms on different places, the financial loss per 
adult of working age is the key yardstick.  A focus on adults of ‘working age’ – the official 
definition in the UK is everyone between the ages of 16 and 64 – is appropriate because the 
UK’s welfare reforms have intentionally been targeted almost exclusively at this group.  By 
contrast, benefit claimants of pensionable age are essentially unaffected by the reforms.  
The main exceptions are a small minority (around 5%) of Housing Benefit recipients in the 
private rented sector who are of pensionable age, and a small number of pensioners who 
have dependent children for whom they receive Child Benefit. 
 
Some of the welfare reforms focus on households – the reforms to Housing Benefit for 
example.  Others – the reforms to incapacity benefits for example – are about the 
entitlement of individuals.  Additionally, several of the reforms impact simultaneously on the 
same households and/or individuals.  It is possible to estimate how many people are 
affected by each element of the reforms, and how much they lose. The financial losses can 
be added together, but to avoid counting the same people twice the number of 
households/individuals affected cannot be summed to an overall total. 
 
Finally, in estimating the impact of the welfare reforms all other factors are held constant.  
What this means in practice is that the figures presented here make no assumptions about 
the growth of the economy or about future levels of employment and unemployment.  Nor do 
they make assumptions about the extent to which reduced support for housing costs feeds 
through to lower rent levels. 
 
UK ministers take the view that the welfare reforms will increase the financial incentives to 
take up employment and because more people will look for work more people will find work.  
This assumes, of course, that extra labour supply leads to extra labour demand from 
employers.  Whether labour markets really do work in this way, especially at times of 
recession or low growth, or in places where the local economy is relatively weak, is a moot 
point and one that many economists would contest.  Some individuals will undoubtedly find 
work to compensate for the loss of benefit income but whether the overall level of 
employment will be any higher as a result is questionable.  More often than not, they will 
simply fill vacancies that would have gone to other jobseekers.  So the figures presented 
8 
 
here do not assume that loss of income from benefits will wholly or in part be replaced by 
additional income from employment. 
 
 
The impact of the reforms 
 
Overall national impact 
 
Table 2 shows the estimated impact of the welfare reforms across the UK as a whole.  As 
noted earlier, when the reforms have come into full effect it is estimated that they will reduce 
government spending by almost £19bn a year.   This represents around £470 a year for 
every adult of working age in the country. 
 
The individual reforms vary greatly in the scale of their impact, in the number of individuals 
or households affected, and in the intensity of the financial loss imposed on those affected.  
A great deal of UK media coverage has focussed on the ‘bedroom tax’ and the overall 
household benefit cap.  In fact, the biggest financial impact comes from the reform of 
incapacity benefits – an estimated reduction in benefit spending of more than £4.3bn a year.  
Changes to Tax Credits and the 1 per cent up-rating of most working-age benefits also 
account for substantial sums - £3.6bn and £3.4bn respectively. 
 
Child Benefit changes affect the largest number of households – some 7.6m. This is 
because the three-year freeze in Child Benefit rates up to April 2014 (instead of up-rating 
with inflation) impacts on all recipients.  A sub-set of households that include a higher earner 
lose more substantial sums in Child Benefit. 
 
The household benefit cap, by contrast, impacts on far fewer households but the average 
financial loss for each of these households is relatively large. 
 
Sickness and disability claimants can expect to be hit hard.  The individuals adversely 
affected by the incapacity benefit reforms can expect to lose an average of £3,500 a year, 
and those losing out as a result of the changeover from Disability Living Allowance to 
Personal Independence Payments by an average of almost £2,500 a year.  Often these will 
be the same individuals: most DLA claimants of working age are out-of-work on incapacity 
benefits and in both cases the group most exposed to benefit reductions are those with less 
severe disabilities or health problems. 
 
The same individuals may also find they encounter reductions in Housing Benefit 
entitlement.  The overall reductions in Housing Benefit are estimated to be more than £1.6bn 
for those in the private rented sector (affected by Local Housing Allowance reforms), £490m 
for those in the social rented sector (affected by the ‘bedroom tax’) and £340m by higher 
deductions for non-dependants (which mostly impact on Housing Benefit).  The losses for 
the households affected – often £1,000 a year – are large. 
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Table 2: Overall impact of welfare reforms by 2014/15 
  
No of 
h'holds/individuals  
adversely affected 
Estimated 
net loss  
£m p.a. 
Average loss per  
adversely affected 
h'hold/individual 
 £ p.a. 
No. of 
 h'holds/individuals 
adversely affected 
per 10,000 
Loss per  
working age adult 
£ p.a. 
Incapacity benefits
(1)(3)
 1,250,000 4,350 3,480 310 110 
Tax Credits 4,500,000 3,660 810 1,750 90 
1 per cent uprating
(3)
 n.a.  3,430 n.a. n.a. 85 
Child Benefit 7,600,000 2,845 370 2,960 70 
Housing Benefit: LHA 1,350,000 1,645 1,220 520 40 
Disability Living Allowance
(1)(2)
 960,000 1,500 2,450 250 40 
Housing Benefit: ‘bedroom tax’ 660,000 490 740 260 10 
Non-dependant deductions 300,000 340 1,130 120 10 
Council Tax Benefit 2,450,000 340 140 950 10 
Household benefit cap 56,000 270 4,820 20 5 
      
Total n.a.  18,870 n.a. n.a. 470 
      
    
   (1)
 Individuals affected; all other data refers to households  
(2)
 By 2017/18 
(3)
 By 2015/16 
 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data  
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The changes to Council Tax Benefit hit large numbers of households – approaching 2.5m, 
though none in Scotland or Wales where the devolved administrations have chosen not to 
pass on the reductions.  The average financial loss per household – and estimated £140 a 
year – is more modest than the other benefit cuts, though still likely to be hard to find in 
many cases. 
 
 
Impact by local authority 
 
Figure 1 shows the overall impact of the welfare reforms by local authority district.  The 
measure used here is the financial loss per adult of working age so the data measures the 
intensity of the financial impact in each area. 
 
The overall impact of the welfare reforms presents a complex picture, not least because 
different reforms impact on places in different ways.  Nevertheless, the map shows clear 
patterns that will be readily recognisable to anyone with a reasonable understanding of the 
geography of the UK.  Three types of area are hit hardest: 
 
The first group comprises the older industrial areas of England, Scotland and Wales.  These 
include substantial parts of North West and North East England, the South Wales Valleys 
and the Glasgow area in Scotland.  Older industrial areas account for the largest proportion 
of the worst-hit places. 
 
The second group of hard-hit places comprises a number of seaside towns.  These include 
Blackpool, Torbay, Hastings, Great Yarmouth and Thanet (which includes Margate).  Not all 
seaside resorts are badly hit but this group – which includes several of the least prosperous 
– matches the impact on older industrial areas. 
 
The third group is made up of a number of London boroughs.  These include not just those 
that have traditionally been identified as ‘deprived’ (for example Hackney) but also boroughs 
such as Westminster and Brent. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, a substantial part of southern England outside London is 
much less acutely affected by the welfare reforms.  A number of rural areas in northern 
England, including most of North Yorkshire and parts of Cumbria, plus the Aberdeen area in 
Scotland, also escape relatively lightly. 
 
 
Worst affected places 
 
To underline the disparities, Table 3 lists the 50 local authority districts worst affected by the 
reforms, measured on a per capita basis, and contrasts this with the 20 least affected.  In 
this and the following table the London boroughs are denoted with the pre-fix ‘LB’. 
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Figure 1: Overall financial loss arising from welfare reform by 2014/15
(1)
, by local authority 
 
(1)
Except  DLA by 2017/18, incapacity benefits and 1% uprating by 2015/16 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
                           
550 +
450 to 550
350 to 450
0 to 350
Greater London 
£ per working age adult p.a. 
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Table 3: Overall impact of welfare reforms by 2014/15
(1)
, by local authority 
 
  
 
Loss per  
working 
age adult 
£ p.a. 
  Loss per 
working 
age adult 
£ p.a. 
 TOP 50 DISTRICTS  
 
(cont)  
1.  Blackpool  910 40.  Great Yarmouth  610 
2.  LB Westminster  820 41.  Sandwell  610 
3.  Knowsley  800 42.  Pendle  610 
4.  Merthyr Tydfil  720 43.  Birmingham  610 
5.  Middlesbrough  720 44.  East Lindsey  610 
6.  Hartlepool  710 45.  Manchester  610 
7.  Torbay  700 46.  West Dunbartonshire  600 
8.  Liverpool  700 47.  Mansfield  600 
9.  Blaenau Gwent  700 48.  LB Lewisham  600 
10.  Neath Port Talbot  700 49.  Bridgend  600 
11.  Hastings  690 50.  Bolsover  600 
12.  Burnley  690    
13.  Rochdale  680  BOTTOM 20 DISTRICTS 
 
 
14.  LB Barking and Dagenham  680 360.  Mid Sussex  280 
15.  LB Brent  680 361.  East Hampshire  280 
16.  Hyndburn  680 362.  Waverley  280 
17.  Blackburn with Darwen  670 363.  Cotswold  270 
18.  Thanet  670 364.  Harborough  270 
19.  Stoke-on-Trent  670 365.  Horsham  270 
20.  Rhondda Cynon Taf  670 366.  Surrey Heath  270 
21.  LB Hackney  670 367.  Mole Valley  270 
22.  LB Enfield  670 368.  South Cambridgeshire  270 
23.  Glasgow  650 369.  Winchester  270 
24.  Salford  640 370.  Chiltern  270 
25.  Caerphilly  640 371.  South Bucks  260 
26.  Oldham  640 372.  Guildford  260 
27.  Wirral  640 373.  South Northamptonshire  260 
28.  LB Haringey  640 374.  South Oxfordshire  260 
29.  St. Helens  630 375.  Rutland  260 
30.  Inverclyde  630 376.  Wokingham  250 
31.  Barrow-in-Furness  630 377.  Cambridge  250 
32.  Kingston upon Hull  630 378.  Hart  240 
33.  Barnsley  630 379.  LB City of London  180 
34.  Tameside  620    
35.  South Tyneside  620    
36.  Halton  620    
37.  Redcar and Cleveland  620    
38.  Sunderland  620    
39.  Tendring  620    
Note: LB, London Borough 
(1) 
Except DLA by 2017/18, incapacity benefits and 1% up-rating by 2015/16
 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data
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At the very top of the list comes Blackpool, the famous seaside resort in North West 
England, where the average loss per working age adult is estimated to be £910 a year.  
Blackpool tops the list for a number of reasons.  It has a high proportion of adults of working 
age out-of-work on benefits, including one of the highest incapacity claimant rates in the 
country.  The high level on out-of-work benefits in Blackpool partly reflects the erosion of the 
town’s traditional tourist base and the associated decline in employment.  Blackpool also has 
a particularly high proportion of households living in the private-rented sector, often in 
properties that were once guest houses or small hotels, who are badly exposed to the 
reductions in Housing Benefit.  It is also worth noting that Blackpool borough (to which the 
figures refer) is something of an ‘inner urban area’ within a larger built-up area that also 
includes Lytham St Anne’s and Fleetwood.  Residential segregation between rich and poor 
parts of the wider urban area accentuates the exposure to welfare reform in Blackpool 
borough itself. 
 
The London borough of Westminster, at number two on the list, is the glaring exception to 
the general rule that the poorest parts of the UK are hit hardest.  But there are special 
factors at work.  One is the possibility that the 2011 Census population figures, used here, 
significantly under-estimate the local population, as Westminster Council has claimed, in 
which case the benefit losses in this table are being spread across too few people and the 
true figure could be lower.  But also the extremely high rents in Westminster mean that, 
more than anywhere else in the UK, the Housing Benefit reforms and the household benefit 
cap lead to very large financial losses here.  The impact of the other welfare reforms on 
Westminster is far more modest. 
 
Beyond Blackpool and Westminster, more than two-thirds of the 50 local authority districts 
worst affected by the reforms could be described as ‘older industrial areas’ – places like 
Liverpool, Stoke-on-Trent, Glasgow, Sunderland and a succession of Welsh Valleys 
(Merthyr Tydfil, Blaenau Gwent, Neath Port Talbot, Rhondda Cynon Taf, Caerphilly). 
 
In all these older industrial areas the incapacity benefit reforms, in particular, hit very hard 
indeed.  This is especially significant because the changes to incapacity benefits are set to 
deliver the largest financial savings to the Exchequer.  Incapacity claimant rates in older 
industrial UK are far in excess of those in more prosperous parts of the country, not least 
because of the problems that men and women with health problems or disabilities face in 
finding work in these difficult local labour markets.  Indeed, in older industrial UK the 
principal labour market adjustment in response to the loss of mining and manufacturing jobs 
has mostly been a diversion onto incapacity benefits rather than unemployment benefits 
(Beatty and Fothergill 2005). 
 
The reforms to Disability Living Allowance also hit hard in older industrial UK, not least 
because DLA is claimed by nearly half of all incapacity benefit claimants (Beatty et al 2009).  
More generally, the higher reliance on benefits and tax credits in older industrial UK means 
that the failure to up-rate with inflation and the reductions to tax credits have a greater 
impact here. 
 
Middlesbrough, at number 5 on the list of hardest-hit districts, is a classic example.  This is a 
town of 138,000 people forming part of the wider Teesside conurbation in North East 
England.  Middlesbrough was once dominated by the steel and chemical industries.  Both 
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still survive in the area but employ only a fraction of the former numbers.  High 
unemployment and incapacity claimant rates have been the result.  Low wages in the local 
economy have fostered a reliance on tax credits, and the high proportion of housing in the 
social-rented sector, which reflect municipal priories over the years, exposes large numbers 
of residents to the ‘bedroom tax’.  Middlesbrough, like many other older industrial areas, is 
therefore hit hard by welfare reform – the estimate is an average loss, across the entire 
working age population, of £720 a head. 
 
In contrast the City of London – the small administrative area covering the main financial 
district, not to be confused with London as a whole – emerges as the least affected part of 
the country, but the City has a very small population and should perhaps be discounted.  
The other places least affected by the welfare reforms, beginning with Hart district (in 
Hampshire) and followed by Cambridge and Wokingham (in Berkshire) are exclusively in the 
south and east of England outside London. 
 
At the extremes, the loss per working age adult in the worst affected districts is approaching 
double the national average (£470 a year).  Conversely, the loss in the least affected districts 
is around half the national average.  Or to express the same figures in a different way, there 
is a four-fold difference in the impact of the welfare reforms between the most and least 
affected districts. 
 
 
Impact on urban UK 
 
Many of the places where the impact of welfare reform is greatest are urban areas.  Four of 
the UK’s largest cities are among the worst-hit 50 districts – Liverpool (at number 8), 
Glasgow (23), Birmingham (43) and Manchester (45).  The data here is for the city council 
area at the core rather than the wider conurbation but a number of immediately adjacent 
local authorities also make the worst 50 – Knowsley, Wirral, St Helens and Halton (near 
Liverpool); Rochdale, Salford, Oldham and Tameside (near Manchester); Inverclyde and 
West Dunbartonshire (near Glasgow) and Sandwell (near Birmingham).  The worst-hit 50 
also includes seven London boroughs. 
 
Conversely, the places escaping lightest – City of London excepted – are nearly all rural or 
commuter districts or, in the case of Cambridge, a comparatively small city.  The obvious 
conclusion would be that the impact of the UK’s welfare reforms falls primarily on urban 
areas. As a generalisation, this is broadly correct. 
 
But in detail the pattern is more complex than simply an urban-rural continuum.  In particular, 
the worst-hit areas include a number of former coalmining districts, in the Welsh Valleys for 
example, where small towns and villages are the norm.  The worst-hit areas also include a 
number of modest-sized industrial towns – Hartlepool, Burnley, Barrow- in Furness, Barnsley 
and Mansfield are examples.  The seaside districts on the list also cover places well below 
city-size. 
 
A more accurate characterisation of impact of the UK’s welfare reforms would therefore be 
that the worst affected areas are not exclusively urban.  Indeed, many urban areas are hit 
hard not because of their size but because they are older industrial areas or run-down 
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seaside towns where there is high worklessness, or in the case of London, because specific 
boroughs are where poorer residents are concentrated or rents are stratospherically high.. 
 
 
Largest absolute losses 
 
Table 4 looks at the same information but from a different angle.  It lists the 20 districts 
where the absolute scale of the financial loss is greatest.  This list is inevitably dominated by 
cities with a large population. 
 
 
Table 4: Districts with largest absolute loss attributable to welfare reform 
 
  
Estimated 
 loss  
£m p.a. 
Loss per  
working age adult 
£ p.a. 
1.  Birmingham  419 610 
2.  Glasgow  269 650 
3.  Leeds  232 460 
4.  Liverpool  227 700 
5.  Manchester  217 610 
6.  Bradford  194 590 
7.  County Durham  188 560 
8.  Sheffield  173 470 
9.  Cornwall  171 520 
10.  LB Brent  146 680 
11.  Bristol 141 480 
12.  Kirklees  140 510 
13.  LB Enfield  136 670 
14.  Edinburgh  135 400 
15.  LB Westminster  133 820 
16.  LB Croydon  129 540 
17.  Wirral  127 640 
18.  LB Newham  127 580 
19.  Leicester  126 560 
20.  LB Ealing  125 540 
Note: LB, London Borough 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
 
 
Birmingham (population 1,073,000) – UK’s largest local authority by some margin – 
somewhat inevitably tops this list with a financial loss of nearly £420m a year, but this is also 
in part because its per capita loss (an estimated £610 per working age adult) is well ahead of 
the national average.  Glasgow (population 593,000) comes second with a loss of nearly 
£270m a year. 
 
Beyond the largest cities, County Durham (population 513,000), which covers an extensive 
and often deprived former mining area, loses nearly £190m a year in benefit income.  
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Cornwall (population 532,000), which has the lowest GDP per head of all English sub-
regions, loses £170m a year.  The worst affected London borough is Brent (population 
311,000), which loses just short of £150m a year. 
 
 
Impact by region 
 
Table 5 summarises the impact by region.  There is a clear pattern here.  The three regions 
of northern England (North East, North West, Yorkshire) are all hit substantially harder, per 
working age adult, than the south and east of England.  This is principally because they 
cover so many of the older industrial areas that are badly affected by the reforms.  In total, 
the three northern English regions lose around £5.2bn a year. 
 
 
Table 5: Overall impact of welfare reforms by 2014/15
(1)
 by region 
  
Estimated 
 loss  
£m p.a. 
Loss per  
working age adult 
£ p.a. 
 North West   2,560 560 
 North East  940 560 
 Wales  1,070 550 
 London  2,910 520 
 Yorkshire and the Humber  1,690 500 
 West Midlands  1,740 490 
 Scotland  1,660 480 
 East Midlands  1,310 450 
 South West  1,440 430 
 East  1,490 400 
 South East  2,060 370 
  
   Great Britain  18,870 470
  
  (1) Except DLA by 2017/18, incapacity benefits and 1% up-rating by 2015/16 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
 
 
London is also hit relatively hard – its loss per working age adult is £50 a year above the GB 
average – but this is primarily because the Housing Benefit reforms affecting tenants in the 
private rented sector, plus the household benefit cap, have a big impact here. 
 
Wales is also hit much harder than the GB average, to much the same extent as northern 
England and essentially for the same reasons – a concentration of older industrial areas 
badly affected by the incapacity benefit reforms in particular.  Scotland escapes a little more 
lightly, partly because it includes areas of prosperity as well as areas of high worklessness 
and partly because the Housing Benefit reforms impact on a relatively small private-rented 
sector. 
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One way of looking at the regional differences is that if the five worst affected regions (the 
three northern English regions plus Wales and London) only experienced the same per 
capita loss as South East England, total incomes there would be £2.8bn a year higher. 
 
 
The relationship to deprivation 
 
There should be no surprises in this geography.  It is to be expected that welfare reforms will 
hit hardest in the places where welfare claimants are concentrated, which in turn tend to be 
the poorest areas.  To underline this point, Figure 2 shows the relationship between the 
impact of the welfare reforms (measured in terms of the loss per adult of working age) and 
the scale of deprivation in each local authority. 
 
The deprivation measure used here is the share of local neighbourhoods (Lower Super 
Output Areas (LSOAs) in England and Wales, Datazones in Scotland) in the worst 20 per 
cent nationally.  To overcome inconsistencies between the separate deprivation indices for 
the constituent countries of the UK, the deprivation figures here are taken from research that 
re- works the data to produce deprivation statistics for the UK as a whole (Payne and Abel 
2012). 
 
There is a clear and unambiguous relationship: as a general rule, the more deprived the 
local authority, the greater the financial hit.  Overall, for every ten percentage point increase 
in the share of neighbourhoods in the most deprived 20 per cent, the scale of the financial 
loss arising from the welfare reforms rises by roughly £60 per adult of working age. 
 
Blackpool and Westminster are the two most significant outliers above the regression line in 
Figure 2.  This means that the financial loss arising from the welfare reforms is much larger 
in these two places than deprivation alone would have suggested.  The reasons, noted 
earlier, are Westminster’s exceptional exposure to the Housing Benefit reforms affecting the 
private rented sector and Blackpool’s unusual combination of very high worklessness and 
very large numbers of Housing Benefit claimants in the private rented sector. 
 
The three east London boroughs of Hackney, Tower Hamlets and Newham are the most 
significant outliers below the regression line, on the right of the diagram.  The share of 
neighbourhoods in the most deprived 20 per cent nationally is exceptionally high here, 
though the scale of the financial losses is no larger than in a number of other places with 
high deprivation. 
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Figure 2: Relationship between impact of welfare reform and deprivation, by local authority 
 
Sources: Sheffield Hallam estimates and Payne and Abel (2012) based on Indices of Deprivation for England, 
Wales and Scotland 
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Concluding remarks 
 
The impacts of the UK’s welfare reform are very substantial – an estimated loss of income of 
approaching £19bn a year once all the reforms have been fully implemented, or an average 
of £470 a year per adult of working age across the whole of Britain.  For some of the 
individuals affected by the changes the loss of income is much, much greater.  What is also 
clear, however, is that the financial losses arising from the reforms hit some places much 
harder than others. 
 
As a general rule, the most deprived local authorities across the UK are hit hardest.  The 
loss of benefit income, which is often large, will have knock-on consequences for local 
spending and thus for local employment, which will in turn will add a further twist to the 
downward spiral.  A key effect of welfare reform will therefore be to widen the gaps in 
prosperity between the best and worst local economies across the country. 
 
At the extremes, as we noted, the loss per head is four times greater in Blackpool than in 
parts of Hampshire.  UK’s older industrial areas, a number of seaside towns and some 
London boroughs are hit hardest.  Much of southern and eastern England outside London 
escapes comparatively lightly. 
 
This is an economic geography that overlaps strongly with the UK’s political geography.  The 
parliamentary constituencies in the south and east of England outside London have 
traditionally elected Conservative or Liberal Democrat MPs – the two parties making up the 
post-2010 Coalition government.  By contrast, the older industrial areas that are so hard hit 
by the welfare reforms have traditionally voted Labour.  It was not necessarily the intention of 
the welfare reforms that they should target Labour-voting areas – rather, this is mainly a by-
product of the higher benefit claimant rates in these places – but the effect is that the 
Coalition government is presiding over national welfare reforms that impact principally on 
individuals and communities outside its own heartlands. 
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